The Config Rule Audit Your IR Playbook Is Missing

<h2> When Agentic AI Breaks Your Pricing Model </h2> <p><a href="https://github.blog/news-insights/company-news/changes-to-github-copilot-individual-plans/" rel="noopener

<h2> The risk in one paragraph </h2> <p>Every time your team deploys software to AWS, a pipeline authenticates with credentials that can modify production infrastructure. In most

<p>On April 25, a Cursor-based agent running Claude Opus 4.6 destroyed PocketOS's production database and backups within nine seconds through one API call, eliminating three

<p>Most GitLab linters tell you if your YAML is valid. Very few tell you if your YAML is <strong>dangerous</strong>.</p> <p>It's easy to feel safe when you see a green build, but

<p><strong>The biggest enterprise AI risk in the next decade may not be a malicious AI. It will be a capable one pursuing the goal it was given — with too much access and nothing

<!-- SC_OFF --><div class="md"><p><strong>Submitted by:</strong> Adam Kruger <strong>Date:</strong> March 23, 2026 <strong>Models Solved:</strong> 3/3 (M1, M2, M3) + Warmup</p>

<p>Most companies shipping AI have never once tried to break it.</p> <p>Not because they don't care about security. Because they assume the model handles it. The model was trained

<p>On March 31, 2026, Anthropic accidentally shipped the entire source code of Claude Code — its flagship AI coding agent — inside a routine npm update. No hack. No reverse