When an agent can prove it is Claude

<p>AI agent authentication is not one protocol. <strong>It is a stack.</strong></p> <p>An agent may need to discover a tool, prove which workload is running, authenticate an HTTP

<p>On March 31, 2026, Anthropic accidentally shipped the entire source code of Claude Code — its flagship AI coding agent — inside a routine npm update. No hack. No reverse

<p>Two independent security research groups published this week with findings that land on the same problem from different angles: AI agent skill files are a serious and

<!-- SC_OFF --><div class="md"><p>I have built a programmable governance layer for AI agents. I am considering to open source completely. Looking for feedback.</p> <p>Agent demos

<h1> Why Every AI Agent Needs a Cryptographic Identity </h1> <h2> The problem nobody is talking about </h2> <p><a class="article-body-image-wrapper"

<p>The OpenAPI Initiative just approved <strong><code>x-agent-trust</code></strong> into its official <a href="https://spec.openapis.org/registry/extension/x-agent-trust.html"

<p>The AI agent economy is about to get very real. When Claude needs to call an API, when a trading bot wants to execute a swap, or when an autonomous researcher needs to purchase

<p>There is a moment in security design when a single observation changes everything. NanoClaw 2.0 shipped recently with a capability that stops most developers cold: a gateway