3 Supabase security incidents, one shared root cause: SECURITY DEFINER inherits

<p><em>This is a submission for <a href="https://dev.to/bugsmash">DEV's Summer Bug Smash: Smash Stories</a> powered by <a href="https://sentry.io/" rel="noopener

<blockquote> <p>Épisode <strong>1/4</strong> de la mini-série <em>La semaine où Supabase m'a menti 4 fois</em>. Les trois épisodes suivants traitent d'une mutation silencieusement

<p>Why Your Supabase Data Is Exposed (And You Don’t Know It)</p> <p><em>The four RLS mistakes that silently leak production data — and how to verify your policies actually

<p>Here is a Supabase row-level security policy. It was on a <code>profiles</code> table holding<br /> names, timezones and weekly availability for real people.<br /> </p> <div

<h2> The Problem </h2> <p>You write a Supabase migration, it runs fine locally. You push to staging — fine. Then you need to re-apply it (rollback test, fresh CI environment, or a

<p>Multi-tenancy looks simple at first.</p> <p>You add an <code>organization_id</code> to your tables, check it in your queries, and move on.</p> <p>The problem is that this puts

<h2> When Agentic AI Breaks Your Pricing Model </h2> <p><a href="https://github.blog/news-insights/company-news/changes-to-github-copilot-individual-plans/" rel="noopener

<p>For a long time, software development followed a predictable pipeline: developers wrote code, pushed features, and handed the application over to the Security or SecOps team