Sandboxes solve where agent code runs. What controls what it does next?

<!-- SC_OFF --><div class="md"><p>For those giving their agents the ability to execute code, how are you sandboxing it?</p> <p>The spectrum seems to be:</p> <ul> <li>Docker

<!-- SC_OFF --><div class="md"><p>I've been following the IETF drafts for agent identity, and I realized there's a massive hole: User-to-Operator trust. We have ways for services

<!-- SC_OFF --><div class="md"><p>I've been experimenting with different ways to give AI agents access to a real computer (not just code execution) and wanted to share what I've

<p>On March 31, 2026, Anthropic accidentally shipped the entire source code of Claude Code — its flagship AI coding agent — inside a routine npm update. No hack. No reverse

<p>Docker published the second entry in its Coding Agent Horror Stories series on July 20, and the operational read is short: on a stock developer laptop, an AI coding agent runs

<h2> Introduction </h2> <p>AI coding assistants like GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Codeium, and Amazon CodeWhisperer now power a significant portion of modern software development and

<!-- SC_OFF --><div class="md"><p>One recurring issue with domain-specific agents is that overly defensive refusal behavior can make them much less useful once the workflow gets

<!-- SC_OFF --><div class="md"><p>Testing agent systems by feeding real natural-language prompts into real runtimes, then scoring whether the correct tool was invoked. No mocks,